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Reverse engineering attack on minterm-camouflaged circuit

  • Shan Jiang
  • , Ning Xu
  • , Xueyan Wang
  • , Qiang Zhou*
  • *此作品的通讯作者
  • Wuhan University of Technology
  • Tsinghua University

科研成果: 期刊稿件文章同行评审

摘要

To further enhance the security of the minterm protection based integrated circuit (IC) camouflaging strategy, an efficient attack technique for its circuit structure defects was proposed, and its improvements were analyzed. Firstly, the implementation methods for the minterm protection based camouflaging strategy proposed by CamoPerturb were analyzed, and the mechanism of the minterm perturbation induced by the gate replacement was demonstrated by leveraging sensitization and implication principles. Then, the replaced gate and the perturbed minterm were calculated by using FAN algorithm as a reference, thus recovering the original circuit structure. The experimental results in ISCAS'89 benchmark circuits and the controllers of OpenSPARC microprocessor, show that the CamoPerturb circuit can be decamouflaged in a few milliseconds by using the proposed method.

源语言英语
页(从-至)187-192
页数6
期刊Dongnan Daxue Xuebao (Ziran Kexue Ban)/Journal of Southeast University (Natural Science Edition)
47
DOI
出版状态已出版 - 20 11月 2017
已对外发布

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