TY - GEN
T1 - Realizing Corrupted-Shard Tolerance
T2 - 32nd ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS 2025
AU - Liu, Yizhong
AU - Liu, Andi
AU - Pan, Zhuocheng
AU - Hu, Yuxuan
AU - Liu, Jianwei
AU - Bian, Song
AU - Lu, Yuan
AU - Guan, Zhenyu
AU - Li, Dawei
AU - Qiu, Meikang
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2025 Copyright held by the owner/author(s).
PY - 2025/11/22
Y1 - 2025/11/22
N2 - Blockchain sharding is a promising approach to enhancing scalability by partitioning the network into smaller, parallel shards. However, existing sharding blockchains that rely on Byzantine fault tolerance protocols require large shard sizes to meet strict security thresholds, limiting scalability, while relaxing security parameters can lead to liveness and safety violations. In this work, we present Camael, a secure sharding blockchain that achieves corrupted-shard tolerance through effective detection and processing mechanisms for both liveness and safety violations. Specifically, fake liveness violations forged by malicious nodes are accurately detected via a two-phase reporting and confirmation mechanism, while concealed safety violations are efficiently identified using a lightweight snapshot mechanism. Furthermore, a state determination process ensures overall system consistency. Malicious nodes are precisely identified through a conviction mechanism, which enables the replacement of the targeted nodes and the reconfiguration of the shards. Notably, Camael ensures security while preserving a global fault tolerance of 1/3 and tolerating corrupted shards, with each shard accommodating up to 2/3 malicious nodes. Extensive experiments conducted on 2000 AWS EC2 nodes across 4 regions demonstrate that Camael improves throughput by 3.56 times compared to the baseline (Kronos, NDSS'25), achieving a throughput of 109.3 ktx/sec, while the violation processing requires only 1.64 sec.
AB - Blockchain sharding is a promising approach to enhancing scalability by partitioning the network into smaller, parallel shards. However, existing sharding blockchains that rely on Byzantine fault tolerance protocols require large shard sizes to meet strict security thresholds, limiting scalability, while relaxing security parameters can lead to liveness and safety violations. In this work, we present Camael, a secure sharding blockchain that achieves corrupted-shard tolerance through effective detection and processing mechanisms for both liveness and safety violations. Specifically, fake liveness violations forged by malicious nodes are accurately detected via a two-phase reporting and confirmation mechanism, while concealed safety violations are efficiently identified using a lightweight snapshot mechanism. Furthermore, a state determination process ensures overall system consistency. Malicious nodes are precisely identified through a conviction mechanism, which enables the replacement of the targeted nodes and the reconfiguration of the shards. Notably, Camael ensures security while preserving a global fault tolerance of 1/3 and tolerating corrupted shards, with each shard accommodating up to 2/3 malicious nodes. Extensive experiments conducted on 2000 AWS EC2 nodes across 4 regions demonstrate that Camael improves throughput by 3.56 times compared to the baseline (Kronos, NDSS'25), achieving a throughput of 109.3 ktx/sec, while the violation processing requires only 1.64 sec.
KW - Byzantine Fault Tolerance
KW - Consensus
KW - Sharding Blockchain
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/105023887372
U2 - 10.1145/3719027.3765132
DO - 10.1145/3719027.3765132
M3 - 会议稿件
AN - SCOPUS:105023887372
T3 - CCS 2025 - Proceedings of the 2025 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
SP - 2099
EP - 2113
BT - CCS 2025 - Proceedings of the 2025 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
PB - Association for Computing Machinery, Inc
Y2 - 13 October 2025 through 17 October 2025
ER -