TY - GEN
T1 - Publicly verifiable auctions with minimal leakage
AU - Wu, Qianhong
AU - Wang, Changjie
AU - Chen, Xiaofeng
AU - Wang, Yumin
PY - 2004
Y1 - 2004
N2 - Publicly verifiable sealed electronic auctions are proposed. The schemes enjoy the following advantages. They require no special trusted parties. After bid opening phase, only the winning price is revealed and the relation of other bidding amounts keep unknown. The winning price is publicly verifiable. Our scheme supports the first-price auction, Vickrey auction and (M+1)st-price auction. Finally, the first-price auction is very efficient and the generic (M+1)st-price auction is applicable when a high standard of security is required.
AB - Publicly verifiable sealed electronic auctions are proposed. The schemes enjoy the following advantages. They require no special trusted parties. After bid opening phase, only the winning price is revealed and the relation of other bidding amounts keep unknown. The winning price is publicly verifiable. Our scheme supports the first-price auction, Vickrey auction and (M+1)st-price auction. Finally, the first-price auction is very efficient and the generic (M+1)st-price auction is applicable when a high standard of security is required.
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/18744408142
U2 - 10.1109/CMPSAC.2004.1342867
DO - 10.1109/CMPSAC.2004.1342867
M3 - 会议稿件
AN - SCOPUS:18744408142
SN - 0769522092
T3 - Proceedings - International Computer Software and Applications Conference
SP - 384
EP - 389
BT - Proceedings of the 28th Annual International Computer Software and Applications Conference, COMPSAC 2004
PB - IEEE Computer Society
T2 - 28th Annual International Computer Software and Applications Conference, COMPSAC 2004
Y2 - 28 September 2004 through 30 September 2004
ER -