TY - JOUR
T1 - Proof of Inaction for outsourced data with exhaustive audit
AU - Han, Tianxu
AU - Wu, Qianhong
AU - Wang, Kun
AU - Zhang, Yingmiao
AU - Xie, Sipeng
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2024 Elsevier Ltd
PY - 2024/9
Y1 - 2024/9
N2 - In the existing environment of cloud storage and distributed hosting solutions, it is imperative to ensure the long-term preservation of inactive data like keyring backups and essential system logs, as these cannot afford the smallest error or data loss during storage. The current methods of subset sampling for data integrity verification fall short of these critical demands. To solve this problem, we introduce Proof of Inaction (PoI), an innovative framework for verifying the integrity of inactive data through verifiable computation principles. First, during the data owner's exhaustive audit, the storage provider must maintain complete possession of all data to validate storage integrity, which means failing any integrity challenge if even a single bit is missing. Second, PoI enables the verification of storage integrity for both single and multiple copies of data, supporting an unlimited number of challenges in each scenario. Utilizing the co-CDH assumption, we validate the correctness and soundness of our approach with the random oracle model. Both theoretical analysis and empirical evidence suggest that PoI's challenge and verification process do not escalate in overhead as the size of the challenged files increases, offering an enhancement over traditional data integrity verification methods.
AB - In the existing environment of cloud storage and distributed hosting solutions, it is imperative to ensure the long-term preservation of inactive data like keyring backups and essential system logs, as these cannot afford the smallest error or data loss during storage. The current methods of subset sampling for data integrity verification fall short of these critical demands. To solve this problem, we introduce Proof of Inaction (PoI), an innovative framework for verifying the integrity of inactive data through verifiable computation principles. First, during the data owner's exhaustive audit, the storage provider must maintain complete possession of all data to validate storage integrity, which means failing any integrity challenge if even a single bit is missing. Second, PoI enables the verification of storage integrity for both single and multiple copies of data, supporting an unlimited number of challenges in each scenario. Utilizing the co-CDH assumption, we validate the correctness and soundness of our approach with the random oracle model. Both theoretical analysis and empirical evidence suggest that PoI's challenge and verification process do not escalate in overhead as the size of the challenged files increases, offering an enhancement over traditional data integrity verification methods.
KW - co-CDH assumption
KW - Proof of Inaction
KW - Soundness
KW - Verifiable polynomial computation
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85197787019
U2 - 10.1016/j.compeleceng.2024.109403
DO - 10.1016/j.compeleceng.2024.109403
M3 - 文章
AN - SCOPUS:85197787019
SN - 0045-7906
VL - 118
JO - Computers and Electrical Engineering
JF - Computers and Electrical Engineering
M1 - 109403
ER -