On the Security of a Pairing-Free Certificateless Signcryption Scheme

Jianhong Zhang; Jian Mao

doi:10.1093/comjnl/bxx081

On the Security of a Pairing-Free Certificateless Signcryption Scheme

Jianhong Zhang^*
, Jian Mao

^*此作品的通讯作者

网络空间安全学院

North China University of Technology
Guangxi Key Lab of Multi-source Information Mining and Security

科研成果: 期刊稿件 › 文章 › 同行评审

5 引用（Scopus）

摘要

Unforgeability is an important security property in signcryption. Recently, Yu et al. proposed a pairing-free and secure certificateless signcryption scheme and demonstrated their scheme was provably secure in the random oracle model. Unfortunately, in this letter, we show their scheme is insecure against the malicious KGC and the malicious sender through proposing two concrete attacks.

源语言	英语
页（从-至）	469-471
页数	3
期刊	Computer Journal
卷	61
期	4
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1093/comjnl/bxx081
出版状态	已出版 - 1 4月 2018

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10.1093/comjnl/bxx081

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引用此

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KW - unforgeability

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On the Security of a Pairing-Free Certificateless Signcryption Scheme

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