@inproceedings{fa882e801d634c01b26d18f2077f7267,
title = "Notice of Retraction: Free cash flow and overinvestment - An empirical evidence from China securities market",
abstract = "Because of principal-agent relationship between managers and shareholders, managers' opportunism often leads to overinvestment in the presence of free cash flow. This paper proves that there is a significantly positive correlation between overinvestment and free cash flow in China's listed companies from the year 2003 to 2005 by empirical method, which is consistent with agency cost explanations. The empirical analysis uses an accounting based framework to measure the free cash flow and overinvestment.",
keywords = "Expected investment, Free cash flow, Overinvestment",
author = "Jian Jianhui and Zhongfu Yu and Pinglin He",
year = "2009",
doi = "10.1109/ICMSS.2009.5305848",
language = "英语",
isbn = "9781424446391",
series = "Proceedings - International Conference on Management and Service Science, MASS 2009",
publisher = "IEEE Computer Society",
booktitle = "Proceedings - International Conference on Management and Service Science, MASS 2009",
address = "美国",
note = "International Conference on Management and Service Science, MASS 2009 ; Conference date: 20-09-2009 Through 22-09-2009",
}