TY - GEN
T1 - Game-Theoretic Analysis on CBDC Adoption
AU - Mou, Chenqi
AU - Tsai, Wei Tek
AU - Jiang, Xiaofang
AU - Yang, Dong
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2021, Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd.
PY - 2021
Y1 - 2021
N2 - As an important blockchain application, CBDC (Central Bank Digital Currency) has received significant worldwide attention as it can restructure financial market, affect national currency policies, and introduce new regulation policies and mechanisms. It is widely predicted that CBDC will introduce numerous digital currency competitions in various aspects of the global financial market, and winners will lead the next wave of digital currency market. This paper applies the game theory to study the competitions between different countries, in particular to analyze whether they should adopt the CBDC program. We propose two game-theoretic models for CBDC adoption, both analyzing whether to adopt the CBDC program via the Nash equilibrium. Both game-theoretic models draw the same conclusion that each country should adopt the CBDC program regardless of the choices of other counties. In other words, current currency leaders should adopt CBDC because it may lose the premier status, and other countries should adopt CBDC otherwise they risk of getting even further behind in the digital economy. According to our game-theoretic models, the current market leader who has 90% of market shares may lose about 19.2% shares if it is not the first mover.
AB - As an important blockchain application, CBDC (Central Bank Digital Currency) has received significant worldwide attention as it can restructure financial market, affect national currency policies, and introduce new regulation policies and mechanisms. It is widely predicted that CBDC will introduce numerous digital currency competitions in various aspects of the global financial market, and winners will lead the next wave of digital currency market. This paper applies the game theory to study the competitions between different countries, in particular to analyze whether they should adopt the CBDC program. We propose two game-theoretic models for CBDC adoption, both analyzing whether to adopt the CBDC program via the Nash equilibrium. Both game-theoretic models draw the same conclusion that each country should adopt the CBDC program regardless of the choices of other counties. In other words, current currency leaders should adopt CBDC because it may lose the premier status, and other countries should adopt CBDC otherwise they risk of getting even further behind in the digital economy. According to our game-theoretic models, the current market leader who has 90% of market shares may lose about 19.2% shares if it is not the first mover.
KW - Blockchain
KW - Central Bank Digital Currency
KW - Currency competition
KW - Game theory
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85104422125
U2 - 10.1007/978-981-16-1160-5_23
DO - 10.1007/978-981-16-1160-5_23
M3 - 会议稿件
AN - SCOPUS:85104422125
SN - 9789811611599
T3 - Communications in Computer and Information Science
SP - 294
EP - 305
BT - Intelligent Computing and Block Chain - 1st BenchCouncil International Federated Conferences, FICC 2020, Revised Selected Papers
A2 - Gao, Wanling
A2 - Hwang, Kai
A2 - Wang , Changyun
A2 - Li, Weiping
A2 - Qiu, Zhigang
A2 - Wang, Lei
A2 - Zhou, Aoying
A2 - Qian, Weining
A2 - Jin, Cheqing
A2 - Zhang, Zhifei
PB - Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH
T2 - 1st BenchCouncil International Federated Intelligent Computing and Block Chain Conferences, FICC 2020
Y2 - 30 October 2020 through 3 November 2020
ER -