TY - JOUR
T1 - DM 2
T2 - Decision-making market for DApps
AU - Fan, Jialiang
AU - Wu, Qianhong
AU - Wang, Qin
AU - Wang, Kun
AU - Dai, Xiaopeng
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2025 Elsevier Ltd
PY - 2025/5
Y1 - 2025/5
N2 - Effective governance is vital for the proper operation and evolution of complex blockchain systems. Traditional blockchain governance mechanisms, primarily reliant on voting, face significant challenges including majority voting errors and incentive mismatch. To address these issues, we proposed DM 2, a decision market designed to incentivize decision-makers and enhance decision accuracy in blockchain governance. In DM 2 participants are encouraged to trade information, effectively resolving incentive shortcomings. Our marketplace can leverage collective intelligence to make decisions even when the majority opinion may be incorrect. We incorporate cryptographic techniques, including homomorphic time-lock puzzles and zero-knowledge proofs, to ensure fairness and security, preventing manipulation and ensuring proper participant rewards. Through a formal mechanism design model, we demonstrate that DM 2 satisfies Bayesian incentive compatibility and budget balance, promoting truthful reporting and efficient market operation. Our implementation and evaluation of DM 2 show its efficiency, scalability, and practicality in real-world settings.
AB - Effective governance is vital for the proper operation and evolution of complex blockchain systems. Traditional blockchain governance mechanisms, primarily reliant on voting, face significant challenges including majority voting errors and incentive mismatch. To address these issues, we proposed DM 2, a decision market designed to incentivize decision-makers and enhance decision accuracy in blockchain governance. In DM 2 participants are encouraged to trade information, effectively resolving incentive shortcomings. Our marketplace can leverage collective intelligence to make decisions even when the majority opinion may be incorrect. We incorporate cryptographic techniques, including homomorphic time-lock puzzles and zero-knowledge proofs, to ensure fairness and security, preventing manipulation and ensuring proper participant rewards. Through a formal mechanism design model, we demonstrate that DM 2 satisfies Bayesian incentive compatibility and budget balance, promoting truthful reporting and efficient market operation. Our implementation and evaluation of DM 2 show its efficiency, scalability, and practicality in real-world settings.
KW - Blockchain governance
KW - Crowd wisdom
KW - Decision-making
KW - Game theory
KW - Mechanism design
KW - Time-locked puzzle
KW - Vote method
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/105004400522
U2 - 10.1016/j.compeleceng.2025.110364
DO - 10.1016/j.compeleceng.2025.110364
M3 - 文章
AN - SCOPUS:105004400522
SN - 0045-7906
VL - 124
JO - Computers and Electrical Engineering
JF - Computers and Electrical Engineering
M1 - 110364
ER -