摘要
The Camellia block cipher has a 128-bit block length, a user key 128, 192 or 256 bits long and a total of 18 rounds for a 128-bit key and 24 rounds for a 192 or 256-bit key. It is a Japanese CRYPTREC-recommended e-government cipher, a European new European schemes for signatures, integrity and encryption (NESSIE) selected cipher and an ISO international standard. In this study, the authors describe a flaw in the approach used to choose plaintexts or ciphertexts in certain previously published square-like cryptanalytic results for Camellia and give two possible approaches to correct them. Finally, by taking advantage of the early abort technique and a few observations on the key schedule of Camellia, the authors present impossible differential attacks on 10-round Camellia with the FL/FL-1 functions under 128 key bits, 11-round Camellia with the FL/FL-1 functions under 192 key bits, 14-round Camellia without the FL/FL-1 functions under 192 key bits and 16-round Camellia without the FL/FL-1 functions under 256 key bits.
| 源语言 | 英语 |
|---|---|
| 页(从-至) | 228-238 |
| 页数 | 11 |
| 期刊 | IET Information Security |
| 卷 | 6 |
| 期 | 3 |
| DOI | |
| 出版状态 | 已出版 - 9月 2012 |
| 已对外发布 | 是 |
指纹
探究 'Cryptanalysis of reduced versions of the Camellia block cipher' 的科研主题。它们共同构成独一无二的指纹。引用此
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