TY - JOUR
T1 - Cooperative Security Analysis of Industry Cloud Control Systems Under False Data Injection Attacks
AU - Zhao, Bing
AU - Gao, Qing
AU - Li, Yuzhe
AU - Lu, Jinhu
AU - Zhang, Kexin
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2013 IEEE.
PY - 2024/5/1
Y1 - 2024/5/1
N2 - This article analyzes a security problem for industry cloud control systems (CCSs), where a malicious false data injection (FDI) attacker may deteriorate the system performance by tampering with the data being transmitted. To improve the robustness of CCSs against FDI attacks, a redundancy-based sensor configuration scheme is provided through analysis of the observability under attacks of the nodes in CCSs. Then, a defending resource allocation scheme is developed based on a two-stage Stackelberg game in order to optimize the overall defense capability of the CCSs with limited defending resource. In this two-stage Stackelberg game, the defender of the CCSs acts first and allocates the defending resource to secure the measurements of wireless sensors. With the knowledge of the defender's strategy, the attacker then decides which target nodes to launch attacks on. The optimal resource allocation strategy is then designed in the sense of the Stackelberg equilibrium. Furthermore, the defense problem under different attacking resource constraints is investigated. Numerical examples illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed approach.
AB - This article analyzes a security problem for industry cloud control systems (CCSs), where a malicious false data injection (FDI) attacker may deteriorate the system performance by tampering with the data being transmitted. To improve the robustness of CCSs against FDI attacks, a redundancy-based sensor configuration scheme is provided through analysis of the observability under attacks of the nodes in CCSs. Then, a defending resource allocation scheme is developed based on a two-stage Stackelberg game in order to optimize the overall defense capability of the CCSs with limited defending resource. In this two-stage Stackelberg game, the defender of the CCSs acts first and allocates the defending resource to secure the measurements of wireless sensors. With the knowledge of the defender's strategy, the attacker then decides which target nodes to launch attacks on. The optimal resource allocation strategy is then designed in the sense of the Stackelberg equilibrium. Furthermore, the defense problem under different attacking resource constraints is investigated. Numerical examples illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed approach.
KW - Cloud control system (CCS)
KW - Stackelberg game
KW - false data injection (FDI) attack
KW - observability under attacks
KW - state reconstruction
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85184341604
U2 - 10.1109/TSMC.2024.3354931
DO - 10.1109/TSMC.2024.3354931
M3 - 文章
AN - SCOPUS:85184341604
SN - 2168-2216
VL - 54
SP - 3124
EP - 3133
JO - IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics: Systems
JF - IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics: Systems
IS - 5
ER -