TY - JOUR
T1 - Channel Access Optimization with Adaptive Congestion Pricing for Cognitive Vehicular Networks
T2 - An Evolutionary Game Approach
AU - Tian, Daxin
AU - Zhou, Jianshan
AU - Wang, Yunpeng
AU - Sheng, Zhengguo
AU - Duan, Xuting
AU - Leung, Victor C.M.
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2002-2012 IEEE.
PY - 2020/4/1
Y1 - 2020/4/1
N2 - Cognitive radio-enabled vehicular nodes as unlicensed users can competitively and opportunistically access the radio spectrum provided by a licensed provider and simultaneously use a dedicated channel for vehicular communications. In such cognitive vehicular networks, channel access optimization plays a key role in making the most of the spectrum resources. In this paper, we present the competition among self-interest-driven vehicular nodes as an evolutionary game and study fundamental properties of the Nash equilibrium and the evolutionary stability. To deal with the inefficiency of the Nash equilibrium, we design a delayed pricing mechanism and propose a discretized replicator dynamics with this pricing mechanism. The strategy adaptation and the channel pricing can be performed in an asynchronous manner, such that vehicular users can obtain the knowledge of the channel prices prior to actually making access decisions. We prove that the Nash equilibrium of the proposed evolutionary dynamics is evolutionary stable and coincides with the social optimum. Besides, performance comparison is also carried out in different environments to demonstrate the effectiveness and advantages of our method over the distributed multi-agent reinforcement learning scheme in current literature in terms of the system convergence, stability and adaptability.
AB - Cognitive radio-enabled vehicular nodes as unlicensed users can competitively and opportunistically access the radio spectrum provided by a licensed provider and simultaneously use a dedicated channel for vehicular communications. In such cognitive vehicular networks, channel access optimization plays a key role in making the most of the spectrum resources. In this paper, we present the competition among self-interest-driven vehicular nodes as an evolutionary game and study fundamental properties of the Nash equilibrium and the evolutionary stability. To deal with the inefficiency of the Nash equilibrium, we design a delayed pricing mechanism and propose a discretized replicator dynamics with this pricing mechanism. The strategy adaptation and the channel pricing can be performed in an asynchronous manner, such that vehicular users can obtain the knowledge of the channel prices prior to actually making access decisions. We prove that the Nash equilibrium of the proposed evolutionary dynamics is evolutionary stable and coincides with the social optimum. Besides, performance comparison is also carried out in different environments to demonstrate the effectiveness and advantages of our method over the distributed multi-agent reinforcement learning scheme in current literature in terms of the system convergence, stability and adaptability.
KW - Cognitive vehicular networks
KW - dynamic pricing
KW - evolutionary game theory
KW - opportunistic spectrum access
KW - vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) communications
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85081677507
U2 - 10.1109/TMC.2019.2901471
DO - 10.1109/TMC.2019.2901471
M3 - 文章
AN - SCOPUS:85081677507
SN - 1536-1233
VL - 19
SP - 803
EP - 820
JO - IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing
JF - IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing
IS - 4
M1 - 8651307
ER -