Attack-Resilient Distributed Nash Equilibrium Seeking for Networked Games Under Unbounded FDI Attacks: Theory and Experiment

An attack-resilient distributed Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking problem is addressed for noncooperative games of networked systems under malicious cyber-attacks, i.e., false data injection (FDI) attacks. Different from many existing distributed NE seeking works, it is practical and challenging to get resilient adaptively distributed NE seeking under unknown and unbounded FDI attacks. An attack-resilient NE seeking algorithm that is distributed (i.e., independent of global information on the graph's algebraic connectivity, Lipschitz and monotone constants of pseudo-gradients, or number of players), is presented by means of incorporating the consensus-based gradient play with a distributed attack identifier so as to achieve simultaneous NE seeking and attack identification asymptotically. Another key characteristic is that FDI attacks are allowed to be unknown and unbounded. By exploiting nonsmooth analysis and stability theory, the global asymptotic convergence of the developed algorithm to the NE is ensured. Moreover, we extend this design to further consider the attack-resilient NE seeking of double-integrator players. Lastly, numerical simulation and practical experiment results are presented to validate the developed algorithms' effectiveness.