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XX-Adv: Physical Adversarial Object Attacks against X-ray Prohibited Item Detection

  • Aishan Liu
  • , Jun Guo
  • , Jiakai Wang
  • , Siyuan Liang
  • , Renshuai Tao
  • , Wenbo Zhou
  • , Cong Liu
  • , Xianglong Liu*
  • , Dacheng Tao
  • *Corresponding author for this work
  • Beihang University
  • Zhongguancun Laboratory
  • Chinese Academy of Sciences
  • University of Science and Technology of China
  • IFLYTEK Co., Ltd.
  • Hefei Comprehensive National Science Center
  • JD Explore Academy

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

Abstract

Adversarial attacks are valuable for evaluating the robustness of deep learning models. Existing attacks are primarily conducted on the visible light spectrum (e.g., pixel-wise texture perturbation). However, attacks targeting texture-free X-ray images remain underexplored, despite the widespread application of X-ray imaging in safety-critical scenarios such as the X-ray detection of prohibited items. In this paper, we take the first step toward the study of adversarial attacks targeted at X-ray prohibited item detection, and reveal the serious threats posed by such attacks in this safety-critical scenario. Specifically, we posit that successful physical adversarial attacks in this scenario should be specially designed to circumvent the challenges posed by color/texture fading and complex overlapping. To this end, we propose X-Adv to generate physically printable metals that act as an adversarial agent capable of deceiving X-ray detectors when placed in luggage. To resolve the issues associated with color/texture fading, we develop a differentiable converter that facilitates the generation of 3D-printable objects with adversarial shapes, using the gradients of a surrogate model rather than directly generating adversarial textures. To place the printed 3D adversarial objects in luggage with complex overlapped instances, we design a policy-based reinforcement learning strategy to find locations eliciting strong attack performance in worst-case scenarios whereby the prohibited items are heavily occluded by other items. To verify the effectiveness of the proposed X-Adv, we conduct extensive experiments in both the digital and the physical world (employing a commercial X-ray security inspection system for the latter case). Furthermore, we present the physical-world X-ray adversarial attack dataset XAD. We hope this paper will draw more attention to the potential threats targeting safety-critical scenarios. Our codes and XAD dataset are available at https://github.com/DIG-Beihang/X-adv.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication32nd USENIX Security Symposium, USENIX Security 2023
PublisherUSENIX Association
Pages3781-3798
Number of pages18
ISBN (Electronic)9781713879497
StatePublished - 2023
Event32nd USENIX Security Symposium, USENIX Security 2023 - Anaheim, United States
Duration: 9 Aug 202311 Aug 2023

Publication series

Name32nd USENIX Security Symposium, USENIX Security 2023
Volume6

Conference

Conference32nd USENIX Security Symposium, USENIX Security 2023
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityAnaheim
Period9/08/2311/08/23

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