Stackelberg Model of Anti-terrorism Resource Allocation in Express Transportation Security Checks

The problem of anti-terrorism security checks of express transportation becomes more and more severe under the Internet shopping model. In this paper, a Stackelberg game model of anti-terrorism resource allocation in express transportation security checks is built to discuss, in terms of single and multiple routes, the optimal resource allocation of express company (defender) including physical security measures, in-box sensor technology, non-intrusive security measures at terminal distribution sites and handover course. It shows that, for the single route, express company should trade off the security costs among the first, second and third level security measures, and should allocate the same security costs of physical security measures for every distribution site. For the multiple routes, the transportation route that terrorists insert the hazardous materials has the lowest probability of physical security measures, and therefore is utilized by terrorists. Thus, the optimal allocation plan of security resources should be the same security costs of non-intrusive security measures at the final distribution sites (the third level security measure) among each transportation routes.