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SRD: Reinforcement-Learned Semantic Perturbation for Backdoor Defense in VLMs

  • Shuhan Xu
  • , Siyuan Liang*
  • , Hongling Zheng
  • , Aishan Liu
  • , Xinbiao Wang
  • , Yong Luo*
  • , Fu Lin*
  • , Leszek Rutkowski
  • , Dacheng Tao
  • *Corresponding author for this work
  • Wuhan University
  • Nanyang Technological University
  • AGH University of Krakow
  • SAN University

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

Abstract

Visual language models (VLMs) have made significant progress in image captioning tasks, yet recent studies have found they are vulnerable to backdoor attacks. Attackers can inject undetectable perturbations into the data during inference, triggering abnormal behavior and generating malicious captions. These attacks are particularly challenging to detect and defend against due to the stealthiness and cross-modal propagation of the trigger signals. In this paper, we identify two key vulnerabilities by analyzing existing attack patterns: (1) the model exhibits abnormal attention concentration on certain regions of the input image, and (2) backdoor attacks often induce semantic drift and sentence incoherence. Based on these insights, we propose Semantic Reward Defense (SRD), a reinforcement learning framework that mitigates backdoor behavior without requiring any prior knowledge of trigger patterns. SRD learns to apply discrete perturbations to sensitive contextual regions of image inputs via a deep Q-network policy, aiming to confuse attention and disrupt the activation of malicious paths. To guide policy optimization, we design a reward signal named semantic fidelity score, which jointly assesses the semantic consistency and linguistic fluency of the generated captions, encouraging the agent to achieve a robust yet faithful output. SRD offers a trigger-agnostic, policy-interpretable defense paradigm that effectively mitigates local (TrojVLM) and global (Shadow-cast) backdoor attacks, reducing ASR to 3.6% and 5.6% respectively, with less than 15% average CIDEr drop on the clean inputs.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
EditorsSven Koenig, Chad Jenkins, Matthew E. Taylor
PublisherAssociation for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence
Pages11397-11405
Number of pages9
Edition14
ISBN (Print)9781577359067, 9781577359067, 9781577359067, 9781577359067, 9781577359067, 9781577359067, 9781577359067, 9781577359067, 9781577359067, 9781577359067, 9781577359067, 9781577359067, 9781577359067, 9781577359067, 9781577359067, 9781577359067, 9781577359067, 9781577359067, 9781577359067, 9781577359067, 9781577359067, 9781577359067, 9781577359067, 9781577359067, 9781577359067, 9781577359067, 9781577359067, 9781577359067, 9781577359067, 9781577359067, 9781577359067, 9781577359067, 9781577359067, 9781577359067, 9781577359067, 9781577359067, 9781577359067, 9781577359067, 9781577359067, 9781577359067, 9781577359067, 9781577359067, 9781577359067, 9781577359067, 9781577359067, 9781577359067, 9781577359067
DOIs
StatePublished - 2026
Event40th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2026 - Singapore, Singapore
Duration: 20 Jan 2026 → 27 Jan 2026

Publication series

NameProceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Number14
Volume40
ISSN (Print)2159-5399
ISSN (Electronic)2374-3468

Conference

Conference40th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2026
Country/TerritorySingapore
CitySingapore
Period20/01/26 → 27/01/26

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