@inproceedings{4eca66e9b36041b2bc6faec15f4d8112,
title = "Rational expectation and information leakage with imperfect competition",
abstract = "In financial market, the return of insider traders generally decreases with the increasing of informed trader number. But they have incentive to leak information to uninformed traders for higher return. We study the incentives to voluntarily leak information with imperfect competitive rational expectations. Our study shows that the return of insider traders is negatively corrected with the precision of leakage information and the number of receiver. When there are fewer receiver and less accurate leakage information, the market liquidity is very low and the loss of noise traders and the return of rational traders are very high.",
keywords = "Imperfect Competition, Information Leakage, Insider Traders, Rational Expectation",
author = "Binbin Chen and Shancun Liu",
note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2016 IEEE.; 28th Chinese Control and Decision Conference, CCDC 2016 ; Conference date: 28-05-2016 Through 30-05-2016",
year = "2016",
month = aug,
day = "3",
doi = "10.1109/CCDC.2016.7531715",
language = "英语",
series = "Proceedings of the 28th Chinese Control and Decision Conference, CCDC 2016",
publisher = "Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.",
pages = "4180--4184",
booktitle = "Proceedings of the 28th Chinese Control and Decision Conference, CCDC 2016",
address = "美国",
}