On the Security of a Pairing-Free Certificateless Signcryption Scheme

Jianhong Zhang; Jian Mao

doi:10.1093/comjnl/bxx081

On the Security of a Pairing-Free Certificateless Signcryption Scheme

Jianhong Zhang^*
, Jian Mao

^*Corresponding author for this work

School of Cyber Science and Technology

North China University of Technology
Guangxi Key Lab of Multi-source Information Mining and Security

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

5 Scopus citations

Abstract

Unforgeability is an important security property in signcryption. Recently, Yu et al. proposed a pairing-free and secure certificateless signcryption scheme and demonstrated their scheme was provably secure in the random oracle model. Unfortunately, in this letter, we show their scheme is insecure against the malicious KGC and the malicious sender through proposing two concrete attacks.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	469-471
Number of pages	3
Journal	Computer Journal
Volume	61
Issue number	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1093/comjnl/bxx081
State	Published - 1 Apr 2018

Keywords

attack
bilinear pairing
certificateless signcryption
security analysis
unforgeability

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10.1093/comjnl/bxx081

Cite this

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abstract = "Unforgeability is an important security property in signcryption. Recently, Yu et al. proposed a pairing-free and secure certificateless signcryption scheme and demonstrated their scheme was provably secure in the random oracle model. Unfortunately, in this letter, we show their scheme is insecure against the malicious KGC and the malicious sender through proposing two concrete attacks.",

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AB - Unforgeability is an important security property in signcryption. Recently, Yu et al. proposed a pairing-free and secure certificateless signcryption scheme and demonstrated their scheme was provably secure in the random oracle model. Unfortunately, in this letter, we show their scheme is insecure against the malicious KGC and the malicious sender through proposing two concrete attacks.

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KW - certificateless signcryption

KW - security analysis

KW - unforgeability

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85045453159

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On the Security of a Pairing-Free Certificateless Signcryption Scheme

Abstract

Keywords

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