TY - GEN
T1 - Isolation and Induction
T2 - 31st ACM International Conference on Multimedia, MM 2023
AU - Guo, Jun
AU - Zheng, Xingyu
AU - Liu, Aishan
AU - Liang, Siyuan
AU - Xiao, Yisong
AU - Wu, Yichao
AU - Liu, Xianglong
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2023 ACM.
PY - 2023/10/27
Y1 - 2023/10/27
N2 - Despite the broad application of Machine Learning models as a Service (MLaaS), they are vulnerable to model stealing attacks. These attacks can replicate the model functionality by using the black-box query process without any prior knowledge of the target victim model. Existing stealing defenses add deceptive perturbations to the victim's posterior probabilities to mislead the attackers. However, these defenses are now suffering problems of high inference computational overheads and unfavorable trade-offs between benign accuracy and stealing robustness, which challenges the feasibility of deployed models in practice. To address the problems, this paper proposes Isolation and Induction (InI), a novel and effective training framework for model stealing defenses. Instead of deploying auxiliary defense modules that introduce redundant inference time, InI directly trains a defensive model by isolating the adversary's training gradient from the expected gradient, which can effectively reduce the inference computational cost. In contrast to adding perturbations over model predictions that harm the benign accuracy, we train models to produce uninformative outputs against stealing queries, which can induce the adversary to extract little useful knowledge from victim models with minimal impact on the benign performance. Extensive experiments on several visual classification datasets (e.g., MNIST and CIFAR10) demonstrate the superior robustness (up to 48% reduction on stealing accuracy) and speed (up to 25.4× faster) of our InI over other state-of-the-art methods. Our codes can be found in https://github.com/DIG-Beihang/InI-Model-Stealing-Defense.
AB - Despite the broad application of Machine Learning models as a Service (MLaaS), they are vulnerable to model stealing attacks. These attacks can replicate the model functionality by using the black-box query process without any prior knowledge of the target victim model. Existing stealing defenses add deceptive perturbations to the victim's posterior probabilities to mislead the attackers. However, these defenses are now suffering problems of high inference computational overheads and unfavorable trade-offs between benign accuracy and stealing robustness, which challenges the feasibility of deployed models in practice. To address the problems, this paper proposes Isolation and Induction (InI), a novel and effective training framework for model stealing defenses. Instead of deploying auxiliary defense modules that introduce redundant inference time, InI directly trains a defensive model by isolating the adversary's training gradient from the expected gradient, which can effectively reduce the inference computational cost. In contrast to adding perturbations over model predictions that harm the benign accuracy, we train models to produce uninformative outputs against stealing queries, which can induce the adversary to extract little useful knowledge from victim models with minimal impact on the benign performance. Extensive experiments on several visual classification datasets (e.g., MNIST and CIFAR10) demonstrate the superior robustness (up to 48% reduction on stealing accuracy) and speed (up to 25.4× faster) of our InI over other state-of-the-art methods. Our codes can be found in https://github.com/DIG-Beihang/InI-Model-Stealing-Defense.
KW - model privacy
KW - model stealing
KW - stealing defense
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85179547144
U2 - 10.1145/3581783.3612092
DO - 10.1145/3581783.3612092
M3 - 会议稿件
AN - SCOPUS:85179547144
T3 - MM 2023 - Proceedings of the 31st ACM International Conference on Multimedia
SP - 4178
EP - 4189
BT - MM 2023 - Proceedings of the 31st ACM International Conference on Multimedia
PB - Association for Computing Machinery, Inc
Y2 - 29 October 2023 through 3 November 2023
ER -