TY - GEN
T1 - Exploring the security of certificate transparency in the wild
AU - Li, Bingyu
AU - Li, Fengjun
AU - Ma, Ziqiang
AU - Wu, Qianhong
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020.
PY - 2020
Y1 - 2020
N2 - Certificate Transparency (CT) is proposed to detect fraudulent certificates and improve the accountability of CAs. CT as an open auditing and monitoring system is based on the idea that all CA-issued certificates are logged in a publicly accessible log server, and that CT-compliant browsers only accept publicly recorded certificates. The purpose of CT is to make all TLS server certificates issued by the CA publicly visible; once a fraudulent certificate is publicly published, it can be discovered by the domain name owner. In practice, the CT can achieve its intended purpose only when the three components (i.e., log server, monitor, and auditor) of the CT cooperate and work correctly and effectively. Compared with traditional PKI systems, the CT framework does not rely on a single trusted party, but as a distributed system that distributes trust guarantees to many CAs, log servers, auditors, and monitors. In this paper, we study the interaction among log servers, monitors, auditors, CAs, domain owners (or websites), browsers, and other components in practice, and then analyze the security impact of each component on the CT. We explore the security of CT framework in practice from multiple perspectives, and find that each component has many security vulnerabilities. Thus, the attackers might first exploit the vulnerability to disable the CT and then launch an attack using fraudulent certificates. The overall security guarantees of CT are jeopardized due to the weak protections of any components.
AB - Certificate Transparency (CT) is proposed to detect fraudulent certificates and improve the accountability of CAs. CT as an open auditing and monitoring system is based on the idea that all CA-issued certificates are logged in a publicly accessible log server, and that CT-compliant browsers only accept publicly recorded certificates. The purpose of CT is to make all TLS server certificates issued by the CA publicly visible; once a fraudulent certificate is publicly published, it can be discovered by the domain name owner. In practice, the CT can achieve its intended purpose only when the three components (i.e., log server, monitor, and auditor) of the CT cooperate and work correctly and effectively. Compared with traditional PKI systems, the CT framework does not rely on a single trusted party, but as a distributed system that distributes trust guarantees to many CAs, log servers, auditors, and monitors. In this paper, we study the interaction among log servers, monitors, auditors, CAs, domain owners (or websites), browsers, and other components in practice, and then analyze the security impact of each component on the CT. We explore the security of CT framework in practice from multiple perspectives, and find that each component has many security vulnerabilities. Thus, the attackers might first exploit the vulnerability to disable the CT and then launch an attack using fraudulent certificates. The overall security guarantees of CT are jeopardized due to the weak protections of any components.
KW - Certificate Transparency (CT)
KW - Fraudulent certificate
KW - Trust management
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85094176548
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-030-61638-0_25
DO - 10.1007/978-3-030-61638-0_25
M3 - 会议稿件
AN - SCOPUS:85094176548
SN - 9783030616373
T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
SP - 453
EP - 470
BT - Applied Cryptography and Network Security Workshops - ACNS 2020 Satellite Workshops, AIBlock, AIHWS, AIoTS, Cloud S and P, SCI, SecMT, and SiMLA, Proceedings
A2 - Zhou, Jianying
A2 - Ahmed, Chuadhry Mujeeb
A2 - Conti, Mauro
A2 - Losiouk, Eleonora
A2 - Au, Man Ho
A2 - Batina, Lejla
A2 - Li, Zhou
A2 - Lin, Jingqiang
A2 - Luo, Bo
A2 - Majumdar, Suryadipta
A2 - Meng, Weizhi
A2 - Ochoa, Martín
A2 - Picek, Stjepan
A2 - Portokalidis, Georgios
A2 - Wang, Cong
A2 - Zhang, Kehuan
PB - Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH
T2 - 2nd ACNS Workshop on Application Intelligence and Blockchain Security, AIBlock 2020, 1st ACNS Workshop on Artificial Intelligence in Hardware Security, AIHWS 2020, 2nd ACNS Workshop on Artificial Intelligence and Industrial IoT Security, AIoTS 2020, 2nd ACNS Workshop on Cloud Security and Privacy, Cloud S and P 2020, 1st ACNS Workshop on Secure Cryptographic Implementation, SCI 2020, 1st ACNS Workshop on Security in Mobile Technologies, SecMT 2020, and 2nd ACNS Workshop on Security in Machine Learning and its Applications, SiMLA 2020, held in parallel with the 18th International Conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security, ACNS 2020
Y2 - 19 October 2020 through 22 October 2020
ER -