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Equilibrium in market maker models

  • Yutao Song*
  • , Shancun Liu
  • *Corresponding author for this work
  • Beihang University

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

Abstract

Considering informed traders' information endogenous production cost and uninformed traders' strategic trading, this paper establishes a gamble model among market maker, informed and uninformed traders using rational expectation idea. It gives and proves the necessary and sufficient condition of the existence of a unique linear equilibrium in market and gets the analytical form of the equilibrium. This model is the extension of the general strategic rational expectation model. The results will be beneficial to further researches such as the optimal market mechanism design, and so on.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings - ICSSSM'07
Subtitle of host publication2007 International Conference on Service Systems and Service Management
DOIs
StatePublished - 2007
EventICSSSM'07: 2007 International Conference on Service Systems and Service Management - Changdu, China
Duration: 9 Jun 200711 Jun 2007

Publication series

NameProceedings - ICSSSM'07: 2007 International Conference on Service Systems and Service Management

Conference

ConferenceICSSSM'07: 2007 International Conference on Service Systems and Service Management
Country/TerritoryChina
CityChangdu
Period9/06/0711/06/07

Keywords

  • Equilibrium
  • Financial market microstructure
  • Informed trader
  • Market maker

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