Abstract
Master key forward security is an important property for identity-based key exchange protocols. Unfortunately, most of existing identity-based key exchange protocols do not satisfy this property. In this paper, we firstly analyse Xie's modified protocol to show that signature is undesirable for an identity-based key agreement protocol with the master key forward secrecy. Then we present two improved protocols from McCullagh-Barreto identity-based key agreement protocol to capture the master key forward security. Our first protocol is efficient and its security can be proved with the help of a decisional oracle, while the second one achieves stronger security and its security can be reduced to a computational problem in the random oracle model. The master key forward secrecy is proved under the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 173-187 |
| Number of pages | 15 |
| Journal | International Journal of Security and Networks |
| Volume | 5 |
| Issue number | 2-3 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Mar 2010 |
Keywords
- Authenticated key exchange
- Identity-based
- Master key forward secrecy
- Provable security
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