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Distributed Nash equilibrium seeking for non-cooperative convex games with local constraints

  • Beihang University

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

Abstract

This paper considers the problem of Nash equilibrium seeking in non-cooperative convex games subjected to local constraints including both equality and inequality constraints. Each player in the game is individually associated with a local objective function, which is coupled with the actions of the other players. The players cannot observe the actions of the players that are not their neighbors. Instead, the players are capable of exchanging information of actions via an undirected and connected communication graph. Thus, a leader-following consensus-based estimation of actions of the players is conducted. Furthermore, a Nash equilibrium seeking algorithm is proposed. Stability analysis by means of continuous time Lyapunov approach is presented and it is shown that the algorithm is capable of achieving global convergence to the Nash equilibrium. A numerical example is given to verify the effectiveness of the results of the paper.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 40th Chinese Control Conference, CCC 2021
EditorsChen Peng, Jian Sun
PublisherIEEE Computer Society
Pages7480-7485
Number of pages6
ISBN (Electronic)9789881563804
DOIs
StatePublished - 26 Jul 2021
Event40th Chinese Control Conference, CCC 2021 - Shanghai, China
Duration: 26 Jul 202128 Jul 2021

Publication series

NameChinese Control Conference, CCC
Volume2021-July
ISSN (Print)1934-1768
ISSN (Electronic)2161-2927

Conference

Conference40th Chinese Control Conference, CCC 2021
Country/TerritoryChina
CityShanghai
Period26/07/2128/07/21

Keywords

  • Leader-following consensus
  • Nash equilibrium
  • local constraints
  • non-cooperative games

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