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Collaboration in networks with randomly chosen agents

  • Zhiwei Cui*
  • , Rui Wang
  • *Corresponding author for this work
  • Beihang University

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

The present paper considers a finite population of agents located in an arbitrary, fixed network. In each period, a small proportion of agents are randomly chosen to play a minimum effort game. They learn from both their own and their neighbors’ experiences and imitate the most successful choices, though they may occasionally make mistakes. We show that in the long run all agents will choose the highest effort level provided that each agent's neighborhood is large.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)129-141
Number of pages13
JournalJournal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Volume129
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Sep 2016

Keywords

  • Imitation
  • Local observation
  • Minimum effort game
  • Rare interaction

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