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AIM: An auction incentive mechanism in wireless networks with opportunistic routing

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

Abstract

Opportunistic routing in wireless networks has strong requirement with nodes'cooperation. But in most realistic networks, nodes perform in their own interests and refuse to forward packets for others when they belong to different organizations. The aim of this paper is to provide a fair incentive mechanism to encourage cooperation and achieve the energy efficient. We propose an auction incentive mechanism (AIM) using a fair pricing mechanism to incentive nodes and modeling the pricing process as an auction game. Furthermore, we proof that, this game has a Bayesian Nash equilibrium point, and the profit of each relay node can be maximized when the game reached Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Our simulation results show that the AIM can effectively incentive network nodes to relay data, so that the network throughput could be improved. And the energy consuming of nodes is balanced that enhances the stability of networks.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings - 2010 13th IEEE International Conference on Computational Science and Engineering, CSE 2010
Pages28-33
Number of pages6
DOIs
StatePublished - 2010
Event2010 13th IEEE International Conference on Computational Science and Engineering, CSE 2010 - Hong Kong, China
Duration: 11 Dec 201013 Dec 2010

Publication series

NameProceedings - 2010 13th IEEE International Conference on Computational Science and Engineering, CSE 2010

Conference

Conference2010 13th IEEE International Conference on Computational Science and Engineering, CSE 2010
Country/TerritoryChina
CityHong Kong
Period11/12/1013/12/10

Keywords

  • Auction game
  • Incentive
  • Opportunistic routing

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