TY - GEN
T1 - A Secure Cross-Shard View-Change Protocol for Sharding Blockchains
AU - Liu, Yizhong
AU - Liu, Jianwei
AU - Hei, Yiming
AU - Xia, Yu
AU - Wu, Qianhong
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2021, Springer Nature Switzerland AG.
PY - 2021
Y1 - 2021
N2 - A complete sharding blockchain consists of many vital components, the two most important of which are the intra-shard consensus algorithm and the cross-shard transaction processing method. The latter usually requires a two-phase commit protocol, which usually relies on the shard leaders to transfer critical messages among different shards. In the process, a leader might behave maliciously. In response to possible problems in cross-shard transaction processing, this paper makes the following contributions. First, this paper proposes a cross-shard transaction censorship attack that may be launched by a shard leader. The leader might behave honestly inside the shard while does not transfer key messages between the shards. Second, a cross-shard view-change protocol is proposed to defend against the attack. When a shard leader behaves maliciously between shards, a related shard’s members can run an intra-shard consensus algorithm to generate a proof of the leader’s malicious behavior and forward the proof to the corresponding shard’s members. The shard members could launch an intra-shard view-change operation to replace the malicious leader with a new one. Third, it is proved that the proposed protocol satisfies consistency and liveness. The secure cross-shard view-change protocol can be applied to most sharding blockchains to ensure the safe and efficient execution of cross-shard transactions.
AB - A complete sharding blockchain consists of many vital components, the two most important of which are the intra-shard consensus algorithm and the cross-shard transaction processing method. The latter usually requires a two-phase commit protocol, which usually relies on the shard leaders to transfer critical messages among different shards. In the process, a leader might behave maliciously. In response to possible problems in cross-shard transaction processing, this paper makes the following contributions. First, this paper proposes a cross-shard transaction censorship attack that may be launched by a shard leader. The leader might behave honestly inside the shard while does not transfer key messages between the shards. Second, a cross-shard view-change protocol is proposed to defend against the attack. When a shard leader behaves maliciously between shards, a related shard’s members can run an intra-shard consensus algorithm to generate a proof of the leader’s malicious behavior and forward the proof to the corresponding shard’s members. The shard members could launch an intra-shard view-change operation to replace the malicious leader with a new one. Third, it is proved that the proposed protocol satisfies consistency and liveness. The secure cross-shard view-change protocol can be applied to most sharding blockchains to ensure the safe and efficient execution of cross-shard transactions.
KW - Cross-shard view-change
KW - Liveness
KW - Sharding blockchain
KW - Transaction censorship
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85120080935
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-030-90567-5_19
DO - 10.1007/978-3-030-90567-5_19
M3 - 会议稿件
AN - SCOPUS:85120080935
SN - 9783030905668
T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
SP - 372
EP - 390
BT - Information Security and Privacy - 26th Australasian Conference, ACISP 2021, Proceedings
A2 - Baek, Joonsang
A2 - Ruj, Sushmita
PB - Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH
T2 - 26th Australasian Conference on Information Security and Privacy, ACISP 2021
Y2 - 1 December 2021 through 3 December 2021
ER -