A retailer-supplier supply chain model with trade credit default risk in supplier-Stackelberg game

C. F. Wu; Q. H. Zhao

A retailer-supplier supply chain model with trade credit default risk in supplier-Stackelberg game

C. F. Wu
, Q. H. Zhao^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

School of Economics and Management

Qingdao University of Science and Technology

Research output: Contribution to conference › Paper › peer-review

Abstract

The purpose of the paper is to formulate a retailer-supplier uncooperative replenishment model with the demand and default risk which are the functions of the trade credit period for determining optimal trade credit period in supplier-Stackelberg game. We first present optimal results of decentralized decision without trade credit. Then, we derive the existence and uniqueness conditions of the optimal solutions for the retailer and the supplier. Moreover, we develop a set of theorems and corollary to determine the optimal solutions.

Original language	English
State	Published - 2015
Event	45th International Conference on Computers and Industrial Engineering, CIE 2015 - Metz, France Duration: 28 Oct 2015 → 30 Oct 2015

Conference

Conference	45th International Conference on Computers and Industrial Engineering, CIE 2015
Country/Territory	France
City	Metz
Period	28/10/15 → 30/10/15

Keywords

Default risk
Delay in payments
Supplier-Stackelberg
Supply chain
Trade credit

Cite this

@conference{ab143944f9824a4eb0dbb709ed0f3e46,

title = "A retailer-supplier supply chain model with trade credit default risk in supplier-Stackelberg game",

abstract = "The purpose of the paper is to formulate a retailer-supplier uncooperative replenishment model with the demand and default risk which are the functions of the trade credit period for determining optimal trade credit period in supplier-Stackelberg game. We first present optimal results of decentralized decision without trade credit. Then, we derive the existence and uniqueness conditions of the optimal solutions for the retailer and the supplier. Moreover, we develop a set of theorems and corollary to determine the optimal solutions.",

keywords = "Default risk, Delay in payments, Supplier-Stackelberg, Supply chain, Trade credit",

author = "Wu, \{C. F.\} and Zhao, \{Q. H.\}",

year = "2015",

language = "英语",

note = "45th International Conference on Computers and Industrial Engineering, CIE 2015 ; Conference date: 28-10-2015 Through 30-10-2015",

}

TY - CONF

T1 - A retailer-supplier supply chain model with trade credit default risk in supplier-Stackelberg game

AU - Wu, C. F.

AU - Zhao, Q. H.

PY - 2015

Y1 - 2015

N2 - The purpose of the paper is to formulate a retailer-supplier uncooperative replenishment model with the demand and default risk which are the functions of the trade credit period for determining optimal trade credit period in supplier-Stackelberg game. We first present optimal results of decentralized decision without trade credit. Then, we derive the existence and uniqueness conditions of the optimal solutions for the retailer and the supplier. Moreover, we develop a set of theorems and corollary to determine the optimal solutions.

AB - The purpose of the paper is to formulate a retailer-supplier uncooperative replenishment model with the demand and default risk which are the functions of the trade credit period for determining optimal trade credit period in supplier-Stackelberg game. We first present optimal results of decentralized decision without trade credit. Then, we derive the existence and uniqueness conditions of the optimal solutions for the retailer and the supplier. Moreover, we develop a set of theorems and corollary to determine the optimal solutions.

KW - Default risk

KW - Delay in payments

KW - Supplier-Stackelberg

KW - Supply chain

KW - Trade credit

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/84963706958

M3 - 论文

AN - SCOPUS:84963706958

T2 - 45th International Conference on Computers and Industrial Engineering, CIE 2015

Y2 - 28 October 2015 through 30 October 2015

ER -

A retailer-supplier supply chain model with trade credit default risk in supplier-Stackelberg game

Abstract

Conference

Keywords

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this