Abstract
With the increase of exclusive behaviors of platform enterprises and complementary enterprises, the problems caused by exclusive behaviors have gradually emerged, so the government has increased its control over exclusive behaviors. Considering the network effect and spillover effect, this paper uses the Spokes model to construct a two-stage game model of platform and complementary enterprises under the exclusive network, and discusses the influence of the exclusive behavior of platform products and complementary products on the innovation investment and pricing of platform enterprises, and compares the innovation investment and pricing with that under the non-exclusive network. The results show that under the exclusive network, the equilibrium state of innovation decisions of the platform and complementary enterprises will change as conditions change. When a single platform and a complementary enterprise make innovation investment, the network effect and spillover effect both promote innovation investment, and the platform and complementary enterprise that choose innovation investment will obtain higher market share. Under certain conditions, the platform and complementary companies that choose not to make innovation investments will be encouraged to invest in innovation. When all platforms and complementary enterprises choose innovation investment, only spillover effect can promote innovation investment. At this moment, the equilibrium profit of the enterprise is inferior to that of enterprises without innovation investment, and enterprises will fall into the "prisoner's dilemma". Compared with non-exclusive networks, enterprises in exclusive networks have less innovation investment, higher product pricing and corporate profits. The conclusion of this paper is helpful to understand the motivation of exclusive behavior of platform enterprises, analyze the negative impact of exclusive behavior on platform economic development, and has important practical significance for platform supervision and antitrust.
| Translated title of the contribution | Platform innovation decisions under exclusive networks: The role of network effects and spillover effects |
|---|---|
| Original language | Chinese (Traditional) |
| Pages (from-to) | 1900-1916 |
| Number of pages | 17 |
| Journal | Xitong Gongcheng Lilun yu Shijian/System Engineering Theory and Practice |
| Volume | 42 |
| Issue number | 7 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Jul 2022 |
| Externally published | Yes |
UN SDGs
This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
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SDG 8 Decent Work and Economic Growth
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